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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Due Process of Law - Cruel and Unusual Punishment by Electro-
cution - Petitioner, Willie Francis, was duly convicted of murder
in a state court in the state of Louisiana and sentenced to be electro-
cuted for said crime. He was placed in the electric chair in the
presence of authorized witnesses. The executioner threw the switch,
but due to a latent electrical defect, the attempt to electrocute Francis
failed. The Governor proposed to issue another death warrant, and
petitioner brought certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United
States from a State Court decision upholding the Governor's action.
He claimed the protection of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment on the ground that an execution under the cir-
cumstances detailed would deny due process to him, on the theory
that due process includes the cruel and unusual punishment pro-
tection afforded under the Eighth Amendment. Petitioner contended
that these constitutional protections would be denied him because
he had once gone through the difficult preparation for execution and
had once received through his body a current of electricity intended
to cause death. Held: Carrying out of the execution of the convicted
murderer, after the first attempt failed because of a mechanical de-
fect in the electric chair, would not constitute "cruel and unusual
punishment", or violate due process. State of Louisiana ex rel Francis
v. Resweber, Sheriff, 67 S. Ct. 374 (1947).
This case is unique, being without precedent in any court. English
history has been characterized by many examples of cruel and un-
usual punishments. Due to these experiences, the Eighth Amend-
ment' to the Constitution of the United States was adopted in 1791
and was followed- by the Fourteenth Amendment2 in 1868. In de-
termining whether a case of cruel and unusual punishment consti-
tutes a violation of due process of law, each case must be con-
sidered upon its particular facts. There have been but few decisions
construing this provision of the Eighth Amendment. No case has
arisen in the Supreme Court of the United States which called for
an exhaustive definition of cruel and unusual punishment. Most of
the cases in which the protection of the Amendment has been invoked
came from state courts of last resort, and the opinions seem to
proceed upon the recognized assumption that the Eighth Amendment
does not restrict the States, and the further assumption that its pro-
visions are not included within the Fourteenth Amendment.3 However,
1 Eighth Amendment: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor cruel and un-
unusual punishments be inflicted."
2 Fourteenth Amendment: "... . Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ."
3 Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. 475 (1867) ; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130; 9 Otto 130 (1879; In re Kemmfer, 136 U.S. 436; 34 L. ed. 519 (1890) ;
McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155; 35 L. ed. 971 (1891); O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323; 36 L. ed. 450 (1892); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126; 48 L.
ed. 121 (1903).
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in Wilkerson v. Utah,- the clause came up for consideration. A statute
of Utah provided that "a person convicted of a capital offense should
suffer death by being shot, hanged, or beheaded as the court may
direct." The statute was sustained. The Supreme Court pointed out
that death was a usual punishment for murder and concluded that it
was not forbidden by the Constitution of the United States as cruel
or unusual. The Court quoted Blackstone as saying that the sentence
of death was generally executed by hanging, but also that circum-
stances of terror, pain or disgrace were sometimes superadded. "Cases
mentioned by the author", the court said, "are where the person
was drawn or dragged to the gallows, hanged and cut down alive
and burnt in oil or where he was disembowelled alive, beheaded and
quartered. Mention is also made of public dissection in murder and
burning alive in treason committed by a female". The Court's final
commentary was that :5
"Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness
the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that
cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is
safe to affirm that punishments of torture, such as those men-
tioned by Blackstone, and all others in the same line of un-
necessary cruelty of the past, are forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution."
It was in line with this ruling that the Court said subsequently in
In re Kemmler, in sustaining the validity of electrocution: 6
"Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a linger-
ing death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life."
The Supreme Court of the United States has continuously ruled
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expresses
a demand for civilized standards which are not defined by the express
guarantees of the first eight amendments. In Snyder v. Commonwealth
of Massachusetts the court stated -7
"The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not withdraw the freedom of a state to enforce its own no-
tions of fairness in the administration of criminal justice unless
in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."
4 Supra, Wilkerson v. Utah.
5 Ibid., 99 U.S. at 135.
5 Ibid., 99 U.S. at 135.6 Supra, In re Kemmler, at 447.
7 Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 at 105, 78 L. ed.
675 at 678 (1934).
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In the case in question, the dissenting opinion contended that
the proposed execution would deny due process to the petitioner
and that the judgment should be vacated and remanded to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana for further proceedings which should
include the determination of material facts not previously determined,
including the extent, if any, to which the electric current was applied
to the relator during his attempted electrocution.8 It stressed that:
(1) The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in deciding the case, regarded
the carrying out of the death sentence as a purely executive function
not subject to judicial review and thus evaded the constitutional issue;
(2) the standard set down by the Court in In re Kemmler9 for a
humane and legal electrocution was not complied with in the instant
case, and (3) the Louisiana Statute0 prescribing capital punishment
should be strictly construed. It appears to the writer that the dis-
senting opinion is little more than an application of mere personal
standards rather than that "tradition and conscience of our people"
which, for purposes of due process, is the standard enjoined by the
Constitution as previously interpreted. The mere fact that the peti-
tioner had already been subjected-to a current of electricity does not
render his subsequent execution cruel or inhuman in the constitutional
sense. The attempt was accidental, not malicious or intentional. The
important fact, however, is that no current of suffcient intensity
to cause death passed through the body of the petitioner, as required
by the Louisiana Statute."' Undoubtedly, had the attempt been will-
ful, or had the statute provided for electrocution by interrupted or
repeated applications of electric current at intervals of several days,
or even minutes, different questions would be raised.
s These material facts refer to the following statements relating to what tran-
spired after the petitioner had been strapped into the electric chair and a
hood placed before his eyes:
"... Then the elect-ocutioner turned on the switch and when he did Willie
Francis' lips puffed out and he groaned and jumped so that the chair came off
the floor. Apparently the switch was turned on twice and then the condemned
man yelled: "Take it off. Let me breathe." Affidavit of official witness Harold
Resweber.
"... This boy really got a shock when they turned that machine on." Affiidavit
of official witness Ignace Doucet.
".. . The boy told me on leaving the chair that the electric current had
"tickled him." Statement of a sheriff of a neighboring parish.
9 Supra, In re Kemmler, at 443: "Application of electricity to the vital parts of
the human body must result in instantaneous, and consequently in painless
death . . ."
10 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure (1928), Act No. 2 of 1928, Art. 569;
Every sentence of death imposed in this State shall be by electrocution; that
is, causing to pass through the body of the person convicted a current of elec-
tricity of sufficient intensity to cause death, and the application and continuance
of such current through the body of the person convicted until such person
is dead."
11 Ibid., Art. 569, Louisiana Statutes.
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This decision illustrates that in the state cases, without a single
exception, there is no prohibition upon the lawmaking power to de-
termine the adequacy with which crimes shall be punished, provided
only the cruel bodily punishments of the past are not resorted to.
So long as they do not offend present standards of decency and make
ope shudder with horror to read of them, as do for instance drawing,
quartering, burning and the like, the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States does not put any limit on state
legislative discretion.
NoRMAN L. SCHATz

